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OPINION OF THE COURT
                    
COWEN, Circuit Judge.
Claudia Librett (“Librett”) and
Michael Marran (“Marran”) were involved
in a protracted custody dispute over their
daughter, Rachel.  After the state
proceedings had ended, Librett and Rachel
brought this action, based on the
allegations of child abuse that had been
made during the custody proceedings.
2They appeal the order of the District Court
dismissing their complaint under Rooker-
Feldman, Younger abstention, and Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.  We will affirm the dismissal,
although on somewhat different grounds
than those given by the District Court.
I.  
Librett and Marran cohabited for a
time in New York, but were never married.
On May 21, 1999, while they were still
living together, Librett gave birth to
Rachel, the couple’s only child.  Shortly
after Rachel’s birth, Marran and Librett
were involved in an altercation that
became physical.  As a result of that
altercation, Marran pled guilty to a state
criminal charge of harassment in the
second degree, and the parties separated.
By consent as approved by the family
court in New York, Librett was granted
sole physical and legal custody of Rachel,
and Marran was allowed supervised
visitation with the child.  Librett was also
granted permission to move with Rachel to
Pennsylvania.  
After Librett and Rachel moved to
Pennsylvania, Marran sought to modify his
visitations by filing a motion in the Court
of Common Pleas of Montgomery County.
Hearings in the matter began in October
2000 and continued through May 24, 2002.
During this time, Marran was permitted
seven unsupervised  visits, wh ich
culminated in an overnight visit from
December 11 to December 12, 2001.
Sometime after May 2002, Librett began
to suspect that Marran had sexually abused
Rachel.  Librett filed several complaints of
abuse with the Montgomery County Office
of Children and Youth (“OCY”).  She also
filed petitions to modify and suspend
Marran’s visitations.  In response, the
Court of Common Pleas suspended
Marran’s visitation rights, and OCY
conducted an investigation into the
allegations.  OCY ultimately determined
that the allegations of sexual abuse were
unfounded.  Relying on these findings, the
Court of Common Pleas reinstated
Marran’s visitation rights.  On January 9,
2003, the Court of Common Pleas issued a
custody order in which it found that there
was nothing to substantiate Librett's
allegations that Marran had sexually
abused Rachel, and found that Librett was
intent on excluding Marran from Rachel’s
life.  The court then awarded joint legal
custody to Marran and Librett, primary
physical custody to Librett, and partial
physical custody to Marran.  Librett
appealed the orders lifting suspension of
Marran’s visitation rights, denying a
subsequent emergency petition based on
the same events, and awarding custody.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed
the orders, including those dealing with the
abuse allegations.  An appeal to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court is now
pending.1
     1Since the custody order was issued,
Librett has continually failed to produce
Rachel for visitation with Marran,
arguing that she should not have to
because of the allegations of sexual
abuse.  She has not alleged any
3Rather than wait for the
Pennsylvania courts to rule on the appeal,
Librett filed this action in the District
Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.  Librett sought damages
from Marran on her own and Rachel’s
behalf, as well as an injunction prohibiting
Marran from abusing Rachel.  The
complaint alleged claims for assault and
battery, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of
implied contract, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and loss of earnings
during minority.  In addition, Librett and
Rachel brought a claim under the Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that
the Montgomery County defendants had
vio la t ed  Libre t t’s  and  Rac hel’ s
constitutional rights by failing to properly
investigate the allegations of abuse.  The
complaint sought monetary damages and a
declaration that OCY’s findings regarding
the abuse allegations were null and void,
and could not be relied upon for any
purpose.
  Both Marran and the Montgomery
County defendants filed motions to
dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that the
District Court lacked jurisdiction over the
claims under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, that the District Court should
abstain from exercising its jurisdiction,
and that the complaint had failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted.
On June 12, 2003, the District Court
dismissed the complaint, holding that it
lacked jurisdiction over all of the claims
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Alternatively, the District Court held that
Younger abstention was proper.  Finally,
the District Court held that the complaint
had failed to state a claim against the
Montgomery County defendants.  This
appeal followed.
II.
As a preliminary matter, the
Montgomery County defendants have filed
a motion to dismiss this appeal.  They
argue that Librett is a fugitive from justice
and should not be entitled to use this
Court’s resources to promote her own
ends, when she is unwilling to follow the
Pennsylvania court’s custody orders.
Although it is troubling that Librett would
blatantly ignore another court’s orders
while seeking relief before this Court, we
are not convinced that dismissal is
warranted, and will deny the motion.
The Supreme Court has recognized
that courts have the power to dismiss a
fugitive’s criminal appeal.  See Molinaro
v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970)
(a fugitive’s escape “disentitles the
defendant to call upon the resources of the
Court for determination of his claims”).
The Supreme Court later held, however,
that a claimant’s failure to appear in a
criminal case does not permit a district
court to grant summary judgment to the
additional instances of abuse other than
the ones deemed unfounded by OCY,
and has produced no further evidence of
abuse.  The Court of Common Pleas held
Librett in contempt for violating two
separate orders in the custody case and
fined Librett $500 for each day she failed
to produce Rachel for visitation.  
4government in a related civil forfeiture
case.  Degan v. United States, 517 U.S.
820, 829 (1996).  In addition, it has held
that an appellate court does not have the
power to dismiss an appeal when a
convicted felon who fled after conviction
but before sentencing was recaptured
before the appeal.  Ortega-Rodriguez v.
United States, 507 U.S. 234, 246 (1993).
The Supreme Court reasoned that,
although the fugitive’s flight acted as an
affront to the district court’s authority,
permitting “an appellate court to sanction
by dismissal any conduct that exhibited
disrespect for any aspect of the judicial
system, even where such conduct has no
connection to the course of the appellate
proceedings,” would sweep to broadly.  Id.
The Court did, however, recognize that
dismissal would be appropriate if the
fugitive’s status in some way prejudiced
the government’s status as a litigant, but
found that the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit had not articulated such
prejudice in dismissing the case. 
In the state court proceedings,
Librett has failed to produce Rachel for the
visitations required by the custody order.
As a result, Librett has been held in
contempt by the Court of Common Pleas
of Montgomery County.  Criminal charges
have also been filed against her in
Montgomery County for interfering with
child custody and concealment of the
whereabouts of a child, in connection with
her refusal to produce Rachel under the
custody order.  Although the finding of
contempt and the criminal charges are very
troubling and relate in part to the events
underlying this case, they have no direct
effect on the processing of this appeal.
Even assuming that Librett is a fugitive
from justice, the Montgomery County
defendants have not shown that her status
as a fugitive would prejudice them in this
appeal.  We also observe that the affront
was to the dignity of the Pennsylvania
courts, not to this Court.  Dismissing this
appeal under the fugitive disentitlement
doctrine would expand that doctrine even
beyond the scope rejected by the Supreme
Court in Ortega-Rodriguez.  Moreover, the
fact that Librett is not acting solely in her
own capacity, but is also representing
Rachel’s interests, complicates the
prospect of dismissal on this basis, as it
would not be fair to penalize Rachel based
on her mother’s fugitive status.  We will
deny the Montgomery County defendants’
motion to dismiss the appeal.
III.
A. 
The District Court held that it
lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine.  We exercise plenary
review over the decision to grant the
motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.  FOCUS v. Allegheny
County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d
834, 839-40 (3d Cir. 1996).  
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars
lower federal courts from exercising
jurisdiction over a case that is the
functional equivalent of an appeal from a
state court judgment.  Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of
Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
5U.S. 462 (1983). A  c a s e  i s  t h e
functional equivalent of an appeal from a
state court judgment in two instances: (1)
when the claim was actually litigated
before the state court; or (2) when the
claim is inextricably intertwined with the
state adjudication.  ITT Corporation v.
Intelnet International Corporation, 366
F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2004).  As we
recently noted, almost any claim that is
actually litigated will also meet the
inextricably intertwined test.  Id.  Unless
the federal claims are identical to the state
court claims, determining whether the
claims have been actually litigated is more
difficult than determining whether the
claims are inextricably intertwined with
the state judgment.  Id. at 211 n.8.  Thus,
we will begin by determining whether the
current claims are inextricably intertwined
with the custody determination.
A claim is inextricably intertwined
with the state court adjudication when
“federal relief can only be predicated upon
a conviction that the state court was
wrong.”  Parkview Assoc. v. City of
Lebanon, 225 F.3d 321, 325 (3d Cir.
2000).  “Rooker-Feldman applies only
when in order to grant the federal plaintiff
the relief sought, the federal court must
determine that the state court judgment
was erroneously entered, or must take
action that would render the state
judgment ineffectual.”  FOCUS, 75 F.3d at
840.
To determine whether a particular
claim for federal relief is inextricably
intertwined with a prior state court
decision, this Court looks at “the questions
of state law that the state court was
required to reach in order to render its
decision.”  Desi’s Pizza v. City of
Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 421 (3d Cir.
2003).  Pennsylvania law requires that
courts consider “the preference of the child
as well as any other factor which
legitimately impacts the child's physical,
intellectual and emotional well-being” in
determining custody.  23 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
5303(a).  Ongoing sexual abuse, as well as
continued association with a past abuser,
would unquestionably impact a child’s
well-being.  In addition, the state court is
required to consider “each parent and adult
household member’s present and past
violent or abusive conduct” in determining
custody.  Id. at § 5303(c).  In other words,
the Court of Common Pleas had to
consider and adjudicate the allegations of
sexual abuse in reaching its determination
that Marran was entitled to joint legal
custody and partial physical custody of
Rachel.    
Librett argues that the Court of
Common Pleas refused to adjudicate the
issue of whether Rachel had been sexually
abused, because the judge in the custody
matter deferred to the findings of the
investigation conducted by OCY, rather
than conduct a separate hearing on the
matter.  In the custody order, however, the
judge explicitly discounted the opinions of
Librett’s experts regarding the alleged
abuse, determined that reports of Rachel’s
behavioral problems after the overnight
visit were a result of Librett’s reaction to
the visit rather than to any abuse, and
discounted the idea that an incident of
6abuse took place during supervised visit.
In making these determinations, the judge
considered the reports of a neutral third
party, the therapist chosen by Librett to
supervise the visits between Marran and
Rachel.  In those reports, the therapist
noted that Rachel responded well to
Marran and gave no indication that
anything was wrong.  The judge further
found that, although Marran may have
made mistakes as a new father, the
program of supervised visitation and
therapy had made him a better father, and
a strong bond existed between him and
Rachel.  In addition, the judge referred to
the findings of OCY that the allegations of
abuse were unfounded, and noted that no
new allegations of abuse had been made.
The fact that no additional hearings were
held does not mean that the issue was not
adjudicated.  Indeed, under Pennsylvania
law the judge was required to adjudicate
the issue of whether the abuse had
occurred, because he was required to
consider a parent’s abusive conduct in
making the custody determination.  See 23
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5303(a).  Whether the
judge erred in not holding a hearing,
accepting other evidence, or allowing
additional testimony after May 2002 is an
issue that must be decided by the
Pennsylvania courts through the appeals
process.
The claims in this case fall into
three categories: (1) Librett’s claims
against Marran; (2) Rachel’s claims
against Marran; and (3) the claims against
the Montgomery County defendants.
Librett’s claims against Marran present the
most straightforward application of
Rooker-Feldman.  Librett seeks damages
for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of
implied contract, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and “loss of earnings
during minority.”  All of these claims are
based on the alleged abuse of Rachel.  In
order for Librett to succeed on these
claims, the District Court would have to
find that the Court of Common Pleas erred
in deciding that the allegations of abuse
were unfounded.  As such, the claims are
inextricably intertwined with the state
court adjudication and the District Court
was correct in finding it lacked jurisdiction
over these claims.
Libre t t  a l so  a rgues  that
Rooker-Feldman does not bar the claims
against Marran, because she and Rachel
are seeking an injunction against further
abuse and damages for past abuse, not
modification of the custody order.  Even
assuming that it is true that no
modification of the custody order would
occur because of an injunction or an award
of  damages, granting an injunction or
award of damages against Marran would
require this Court to find that the Court of
Common Pleas erred in finding that the
abuse allegations were unfounded.
Rooker-Feldman bars all of Librett’s
claims against Marran.
Rachel’s claims against Marran
present a slightly more complicated issue.
Generally, Rooker-Feldman does not bar
claims by persons who were not parties to
the underlying state action.  Valenti v.
Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288, 297-98 (3d Cir.
1992).  As we have noted, “[t]his limiting
7principle of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
‘has a close affinity to the principles
embodied in the legal concepts of claim
and issue preclusion.’”  Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industry Corp., 364
F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting
Valenti, 962 F.3d at 297).  For example, as
with claim preclusion and issue preclusion,
Rooker-Feldman bars actions brought by
parties in privity with the parties in the
state action.  Id.  
Privity “is merely a word used to
say that the relationship between one who
is a party on the record and another is
close enough to include that other within
the res judicata.”  EEOC v. United States
Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489, 493 (3d Cir.
1990) (quoting Bruszewski v. United
States, 181 F.2d 419, 423 (3d Cir.)).  “One
relationship long held to fall within the
concept of privity is that between a
nonparty and party who acts as the
nonparty’s representative.”  Id.  Even if a
child is not a party to a custody action her
federal claims will be barred if the child is
in privity with the named parties (her
parents).
Rachel was not a named party in the
underlying custody proceeding.  The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has never
ruled that a child is a party to her own
custody hearing, and it is unclear whether
a child who is the subject of a custody
hearing is in privity to her parents.  A
recent Superior Court decision has held,
however, that three boys could not
intervene in their own custody action in
order to assert their own interests.    Frank
v. Frank, 833 A.2d 194, 197 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2003).  In Frank, the Superior Court
reasoned that “there is no need for a child
to intervene in his or her own custody
proceeding” because the child’s interests
are the subject of the hearing, and allowing
such an intervention would be “ineffectual
as being redundant.”  Id.  It then held that
the boys’ claims were barred by collateral
estoppel, as they had already been
addressed and decided in the custody
hearing.  Id.  
Other states have similarly held that
there is no need to make children parties to
the custody litigation, either through
intervention or other means.  See, e.g.,
Auclair v. Auclair, 730 A.2d 1260, 1270
(Md. App. 1999); Miller v. Miller, 677
A.2d 64, 66-67 (Me. 1996); Hartley v.
Hartley, 886 P.2d 665, 673-74 (Colo.
1994); Leigh v. Aiken, 311 So. 2d 444
(Ala. 1975).  In some of those cases, the
court relied on the availability of a
guardian ad litem to represent the
children’s interests.  See e.g., Auclair, 730
A.2d at 1270; Miller, 677 A.2d at 66-67;
Hartley, 886 P.2d at 673-74.  In other
cases, no guardian ad litem was involved,
and only the parents were parties to the
action.  Leigh, 311 So.2d at 446-48 (court
did not err in not appointing guardian ad
litem, when none was requested and the
nature of custody proceedings is already
protective of the child’s interests).  
In all of the cases, the courts
recognized that the child’s best interests
were the guiding force in the custody
determination and reasoned those interests
were already adequately represented,
whether by an appointed guardian ad litem
8or by the parents and court.  Courts have
generally recognized that a child’s
interests in a custody dispute are
represented by the parents, even when the
child makes no motion to intervene.  See
generally, Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families for Equality and Reform, 431
U.S. 816, 842 n. 44 (1977) (in litigation, a
child’s rights are generally represented by
a parent or guardian, because the child
herself lacks the capacity to represent her
own interests); In re Tamara R., 764 A.2d
844, 849 (Md. App. 2000) (“Unless a
guardian ad litem is appointed, the
children's interests are presumed to be
represented by their respective parents.”).
In Frank, the Superior Court did not
explain whether the boys’ claims were
estopped because they were deemed
parties to the action or because they were
in privity to one or both of their parents,
who were parties to the action.  The
precise distinction is unnecessary to our
analysis, however, as Rooker-Feldman
bars both the parties to the state action and
persons in privity with those parties from
relitigating in federal court the issues
decided in a state court.  We therefore hold
that Rooker-Feldman bars a minor child
from relitigating in federal court the issues
concerning the child that were adjudicated
in a state custody determination.  Rachel’s
claims against Marran are barred, for the
same reasons that Librett’s claims against
Marran are barred.  
The claims against the Montgomery
County defendants are even more
involved.  Librett alleges that the
Montgomery County defendants violated
her cons titutiona l rights to th e
companionship, care, custody, and
management of Rachel by failing to
conduct an adequate investigation into the
allegations of sexual abuse.  She also
alleges that this failure to investigate the
allegations adequately caused emotional
distress to both Librett and Rachel.  She
seeks damages under § 1983, as well as a
declaration that the investigation was
inadequate and a declaration that the
findings “are null and void and may not be
relied upon for any purpose.”  (App. at
19). 
The District Court reasoned that the
Montgomery County defendants were in
privity with Marran, and as such, the
claims against them were barred by
Rooker-Feldman.  Although it is not
entirely clear how the District Court found
a privity relationship between Marran and
the Montgomery County defendants,
privity is not required.  As we recently
noted, “we have never deemed Rooker-
Feldman inapplicable based on the non-
participation in state court of a party
asserting the jurisdictional bar.”  ITT
Corporation, 366 F.3d at 216 n.19.
Instead, the question must be whether the
issues underlying the claims against the
Montgomery County defendants were
actually litigated in or are inextricably
i n t e r t w i n e d  w i t h  t h e  cu s t o d y
determination.
We  have held that Rooker-Feldman
deprived a district court of jurisdiction
over an attorney’s challenge to the
decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court disbarring him.  Stern v. Nix, 840
9F.2d 208 (3d Cir. 1988).  The attorney in
Stern framed the claim as a constitutional
challenge to certain rules governing
attorney discipline, and sought an
injunction barring the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court from disbarring himself
and other similarly situated attorneys if
those rules were applied.  Id. at 212.  We
recognized that, at first glance, the
challenge appeared to be a general
constitutional challenge to the rules and
not barred by Rooker-Feldman, but then
went on to reason that the nature of the
injunction sought indicated that “Stern’s
complaint is simply a skillful attempt to
mask the true purpose of the action, which
essentially is to reverse the judicial
decision of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, in contravention of
Rooker-Feldman.”  Id. 
In a later case, we held that a
similar challenge to the Pennsylvania rules
governing attorney discipline was not
barred by Rooker-Feldman.  Centifanti v.
Nix, 865 F.2d 1422 (3d Cir. 1989).
Centifanti alleged that certain rules were
unconstitutional on their face, and sought
an injunction barring the prospective
application of those rules.  Id. at 1426.
The district court, citing Stern, dismissed
C e n t i f a n i ’ s  c o m p l a i n t  u n d e r
Rooker-Feldman.  Id.  We reversed,
however, stating that the prospective
nature of the injunction meant that it was
not barred by Rooker-Feldman.  Id. at
1429-30.  We also found that the federal
claim was not inextricably intertwined
with the state claim, because a federal
court could find that the rules were
unconstitutional without attacking the
judgment of the state court that Centifanti
had violated those rules.  Id. at 1430.
The declaratory judgment that
Librett seeks against the Montgomery
County defendants is akin to the injunction
sought in Stern.  She seeks a ruling that the
findings are null and void and may not be
relied upon for any purpose.  This relief is
barred under Rooker-Feldman, because it
is an indirect attack on the custody
determination already adjudicated in state
court.  The Court of Common Pleas
deferred to OCY’s findings that the abuse
allegations were unfounded, and based its
custody determination on those findings.
A declaration by this Court that those
findings may not be relied on necessarily
implies a finding that the Court of
Common Pleas was in error.  This is the
type of indirect appeal of a state court
dete r m i n a t io n  i s  p r o h ib i t e d  by
Rooker-Feldman.
Despite the fact that Librett and
Rachel attempted to seek relief prohibited
by Rooker-Feldman, the § 1983 claim
itself is not barred by Rooker-Feldman.  In
Ernst v. Child & Youth Services of
Chester County, which also involved child
custody matters, a custodial grandmother
alleged that Child and Youth Services
(“CYS”) had improperly formulated and
made recommendations to the state court
in a dependency proceeding regarding her
granddaughter.  Ernst v. Child and Youth
Services of Chester County, 108 F.3d 486
(3d Cir. 1996).  We held that 
[t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine did
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not preclude the district court from
deciding those claims, because a
ruling that the defendants violated
Ernst's rights to substantive due
p r o c e s s  b y  m a k i n g
recommendations to the state court
out of malice or personal bias
would not have required the court
to find that the state court
judgments made on the basis of
those recommendations were
erroneous.
Id. at 491-92.  Likewise, in this case, a
finding that the Montgomery County
defendants violated Librett’s or Rachel’s
substantive due process rights in
investigating the allegations of abuse
would not require a finding that the Court
of Common Pleas erred in relying on the
report stemming from the investigation.
This is not to say that such a determination
would not have an effect on the custody
determination.  Armed with such a
judgment, Librett may be in a position to
seek reconsideration of the custody order.
Nevertheless, Rooker-Feldman is not
implicated, and the District Court erred in
dismissing this claim for lack of
jurisdiction.2 
B.
The District Court went on to find
that abstention was proper with respect to
the § 1983 claims under the principles
enunciated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971).  We exercise plenary review
over the question of whether the elements
required for abstention exist.  FOCUS, 75
F.3d at 834.  If all of the elements are
present, we review the District Court’s
     2The Montgomery County defendants
also argue that the § 1983 claims are
barred, because Rooker-Feldman bars
constitutional claims that could have
been but were not raised during the state
court proceedings.  This is not exactly
the case.  We have held that
Rooker-Feldman barred the plaintiffs
from raising a First Amendment
challenge in federal court, even though it
had never actually been litigated at the
state court level. Valenti, 962 F.2d at
296.   In Valenti, the plaintiffs had
challenged an election law on equal
protection grounds, but did not raise a
First Amendment challenge.  Id.  We
held that the claim was barred, because it
could have been raised in the state
matter.  We later explained, however,
that such claims were barred only if they
were inextricably intertwined in the state
court proceedings.  Parkview Assoc., 225
F.3d at 326-29.  Thus, a constitutional
claim is only barred if finding merit in
the claim would require a finding that the
state court was wrong.  Id. at 326.  In this
case, a finding that the underlying
investigation conducted by OCY was
constitutionally insufficient would not
indicate that the state court wrongly
relied upon OCY’s recommendations.  It
would merely mean that OCY did not
properly perform its job.  As such, the
challenge is not inextricably intertwined
with the custody proceedings. 
11
decision to abstain for abuse of discretion.
Younger established that federal
courts should abstain from enjoining state
criminal prosecutions, because of
principles of comity and federalism, unless
certain extraordinary circumstances exist.
Younger, 401 U.S at 49-54.  This holding
has been expanded over time to apply to
noncriminal judicial proceedings that
implicate important state interests.
Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v.
Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432
(1982).  “A federal court will only
consider Younger abstention when the
requested equitable relief would constitute
federal interference in state judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings.”  Marks v.
Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 883 (3d Cir. 1994)
(emphasis added).  The proponent of
abstention must show that “(1) there are
ongoing state proceedings that are judicial
in nature; (2) the state proceedings
implicate important state interests; and (3)
the state proceedings afford an adequate
opportunity to raise federal claims.”
Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir.
1989).
The Supreme Court has never
explicitly decided whether Younger
abstention covers actions for damages as
well as equitable relief.  See Deakins v.
Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 202 (1988); see
also Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517
U.S. 706, 719 (1996).  In Deakins, the
Court reserved the question of whether a
federal court could decline to exercise
jurisdiction over a claim for damages
under the principles in Younger, but
approved of this Circuit’s rule requiring
courts to stay, rather than dismiss, actions
for damages that were not cognizable in
ongoing state proceedings.  Deakins, 484
U.S. at 202.  In Quackenbush, the Supreme
Court held that, in cases removed from
state court, remand under abstention
principles was proper only when
discretionary relief, such as an injunction
or declaratory judgment, was sought.
Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 730.  These
cases seem to indicate that abstention
under Younger principles is not proper
when damages are sought.
Even if Younger abstention is
proper in suits for damages, it was not
appropriate for the District Court to
abstain from the § 1983 claims in this case.
While it is true that litigation regarding
custody is still ongoing in the state court,
there are no ongoing state proceedings
regarding the adequacy of OCY’s
investigation.  When there are no pending
state proceedings, Younger abstention is
inappropriate.  FOCUS, 75 F.3d at 843.3  
     3Librett argues that Ankenbrandt v.
Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705 (1992),
precludes a federal court from ever
declining jurisdiction under Younger
principles when the case involves
domestic relations, unless the plaintiff
directly asks for a divorce, custody, or
alimony decree.  This is simply not true. 
In Ankenbrandt, a mother sued a father
on behalf of their children, seeking
damages for abuse.  Id. at 691. The
district court found that it lacked
jurisdiction over the action because of
the “domestic relations” exception to
12
C.
Although the District Court erred in
dismissing the § 1983 claims under both
Rooker-Feldman and Younger abstention,
dismissal was still proper under Rule
12(b)(6).  A motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim may be granted only if,
accepting all well-pleaded allegations in
the complaint as true and viewing them in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the
plaintiff is still not entitled to relief.  Bd.
of Trustees of Teamsters Local 863
Pension Fund v. Foodtown, Inc., 296 F.3d
164, 168 (3d Cir. 2003).  To make out a
prima facie case under § 1983, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that a person, acting
under color of law, deprived him of a
federal right.  Berg v. County of
Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir.
2000).  “Section 1983 is not a source of
substantive rights and does not provide
redress for common law torts–the plaintiff
must allege a violation of a federal right.”
Id.    
“Local governing bodies . . . may be
sued directly under § 1983 for monetary,
declaratory, or injunctive relief where . . .
the action that is alleged to be
unconstitutional implements or executes a
policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or
dec is ion  offic ia l ly adop ted  and
promulgated by that body's officers.”
Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S.
658, 690 (1978).  In addition, local
gov ernm ents  c a n  b e  s u e d  f or
“constitutional deprivations visited
pursuant to governmental ‘custom.’” Id. at
690-91.  Local governments are not liable
“unless action pursuant to official policy
of some nature caused a constitutional
tort.”  Id. at 691.  In other words, a county
(or its agencies) may not be sued under a
respondeat superior theory.  Therefore, a
prima facie case against a county must
involve an allegation of a policy or custom
that directed or caused the constitutional
deprivation.
Librett alleges that OCY’s failure
diversity jurisdiction.  Id.  In the
alternative, the district court found that it
would abstain from exercising
jurisdiction under the principles of
Younger.  Id.  
The Supreme Court confirmed
that a “domestic relations” exception to
diversity jurisdiction did exist, but that it
was only applicable in a narrow set of
circumstances not present in that case. 
Id. at 703.  The Court then examined the
alternative holding under Younger and
found that abstention was inappropriate
in that case, because the father’s rights
had already been severed and there were
no ongoing proceedings in state court. 
Id. at 705.  Ankenbrandt does not stand
for the proposition that Younger
abstention is never appropriate in cases
involving domestic relations.  It held that
Younger abstention is inappropriate in
domestic relations cases when there are
no ongoing proceedings.  Id. at 705.  In
this case, the District Court relied on
Rooker-Feldman in finding that it lacked
jurisdiction over Librett’s and Rachel’s
claims.  The “domestic relations”
exception to diversity jurisdiction was
not relied on. 
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“to consult even one of the mental health
professionals to whom Rachel Marran
described the sexual abuse she had
experienced at the hands of her father . . .
denied Ms. Librett her constitutionally
protected rights in the companionship,
care, custody, and management of her
daughter Rachel” and caused severe
emotional distress to both Rachel and
Librett.  (App. at 46.)  Assuming,
arguendo, that Librett properly alleged a
constitutional violation, Librett did not
allege that a policy or custom of OCY or
Montgomery County led to the violation.
This is an essential part of a § 1983 claim
against a county.  Without an allegation of
a policy or custom, Librett has not stated a
prima facie case, and the District Court
properly dismissed the claim without
permitting discovery. 
IV.
The claims against Marran and the
attempt to seek declaratory judgment that
OCY’s findings are null and void and may
not be relied upon for any purpose are an
attempt by Librett and Rachel to relitigate
an issue already decided by the
Montgomery County Court of Common
Pleas.  The District Court properly
dismissed them under Rooker-Feldman.  In
addition, the remaining claims against the
Montgomery County defendants were
properly dismissed for failure to state a
claim, and Librett has conceded that she is
unable to properly state a claim.4  
The District Court’s order of June
12, 2003, dismissing the complaint will be
affirmed.
     4Librett asserts that, in the § 1983
claim, she would claim that Montgomery
County lacked a policy requiring
reasonable investigations, or that it had
such a policy, but that the policy was
breached in this case.  Even if she were
allowed to amend her complaint to
include such allegations, she would still
fail to properly state a claim against the
Montgomery County defendants under §
1983.
